In a 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled DHS can continue with termination of Haitian and Syrian TPS, as Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars judicial review of non-constitutional claims related to TPS and Miot respondents’ equal protection claim is unlikely to succeed. (Trump v. Miot (25-1084) was consolidated with this case, Mullin v. Doe (25-1083)).
The Court held, the Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars judicial review of non-constitutional claims related to Temporary Protected Status (TPS); Miot respondents’ equal protection claim— that Haiti’s TPS designation was terminated because of race — is unlikely to succeed because a race-neutral explanation for the government’s action exists: the current administration opposes the TPS program as it has been implemented in the past and has terminated every TPS designation that has come up for renewal.
The Reversed and remanded, 6-3, in an opinion by Samuel Alito on Jun 25, 2026. Justice Alito announced the judgement of the court and delivered the opinion of the court except as to Part III-A. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined the opinion in full, and Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined it except for Part III-A. Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson.
Held:
- The TPS statute bars judicial review of non-constitutional claims.
Pp. 12–18.
(a) Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) provides that “[t]here is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state.” The term “determination” may mean either an individual decision or the process leading to a decision. Under either understanding, §1254a(b)(5)(A) bars all of respondents’ non-constitutional claims. Further, the phrase “with respect to” “generally has a
broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only its subject but also matters relating to that subject.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 339 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pp. 12–13.
(b) Respondents and the courts below offer no sound theories to overcome the plain meaning of the judicial-review bar. Pp. 13–18.
(1) Respondents’ argument that §1254a(b)(5)(A) applies only to substantive claims, not those based on alleged procedural errors, finds no support in the statutory language because a “determination” may concern procedural or substantive questions. Respondents’ reliance on McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, and Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, is misplaced because those decisions turned on the specific wording of different provisions and did not adopt the broad principle that the term “determination” applies only to substantive matters. Pp. 13–15.
(2) Doe respondents’ argument that “determination” refers only to an assessment of country conditions finds no support in the statute’s text or context and contravenes the principle that we give common terms their ordinary meaning. See Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation, 594 U. S. 338, 353. Pp. 15–17.
(3) Respondents’ attempt to limit the judicial-review bar to the Secretary’s ultimate “determination”—not any subsidiary decision—is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory text and contradicts the administrative-law principle that subsidiary decisions merge
into final agency action. See Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 578 U. S. 590, 597–598. Pp. 17–18.
2. Miot respondents’ equal protection claim—that Haiti’s TPS designation was terminated because of race—is unlikely to succeed.
Ironically, respondents themselves offer a race-neutral explanation for the Government’s action: namely, that the current administration, which has terminated every TPS designation that has come up for renewal, simply opposes the TPS program as it has been implemented in the past.
The Court assumes for the sake of argument that heightened scrutiny applies and that it must determine whether a “discriminatory purpose [was] a motivating factor in the decision” to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265–266. Because application of that standard calls for consideration of the context in which a challenged statement was made, id., at 267–268, the immigration context is an important factor.
None of the cited statements by either the President or the Secretary was overtly racial, and in substance all expressed policy views that could rest on race-neutral justifications. Viewing all the relevant evidence, Miot respondents are unlikely to prove that race was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation, and it follows that they are not entitled to interim relief on their equal protection claim. Pp. 20–24.
Justice Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson
Justic Kagan: For over a decade, the Government has provided humanitarian relief to Haitians and Syrians in the US through the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program. The Secretary of DHS first designated Haiti for the program in 2010 after an earthquake devastated the country; the Secretary designated Syria in 2012 because of the government and military’s brutal repression of country’s civilian population.
Since those initial designations, Secretaries have repeatedly examined the conditions in the two countries, and have repeatedly determined that they remain too dangerous to permit safe return.
As a result, those countries’ TPS designations have been extended year after year, and hundreds of thousands of Haitians and Syrians have been able to live and work here. But that is no longer so, and the suits before us challenge that change. Last year, then-Secretary Noem, at the instigation of President Trump, terminated Haiti’s and Syria’s TPS designations, declaring the countries now safe.
Haitian and Syrian TPS holders brought these cases, and sought interim relief allowing them to stay here while the litigation progressed. The District Courts granted that relief, finding (among other things) that the terminations were likely unlawful. Both courts concluded that the Secretary probably violated the TPS statute by ordering the terminations without first consulting with other agencies about current country conditions. And the District Court in the Haiti litigation found as well that the plaintiffs had a likely successful equal protection claim, in part because statements made by the President showed that a racially discriminatory purpose had entered into the TPS termination.
Today the Court undoes that preliminary relief—insisting that the terminations take effect now—based on two mistakes about the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success.
First, the majority asserts that the Secretary’s compliance with the TPS statute is in every respect unreviewable by the courts. But in fact the statute allows judicial review of whether the Secretary adhered to the procedures it mandates—which is what the plaintiffs dispute here.
Second, the majority claims to see no evidence that race played any role in the Haiti decision. But the evidence is there, plain to see, in the President’s statements, which the majority (and for that matter, his own lawyers) cannot even bear to repeat. Once that much is established, the case for interim relief is made: There is no dispute that the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm absent postponement of the TPS decisions. So the plaintiffs are entitled to stay in this country while these suits go forward. Respectfully, I dissent.